Moltbot, now commonly discussed alongside the OpenClaw project, is part of a fast moving wave of agentic AI tooling designed to do real work on a user’s behalf. Instead of answering a question and stopping, an agent can connect to apps, pull data from services, run commands, and chain actions together. That convenience is exactly what turns Moltbot into a security discussion, because the agent sits at the intersection of productivity and privileged access. 

Why Moltbot creates real security implications

Agent frameworks expand risk in a few predictable ways.

First, the permissions are the product. If an agent can read files, access mail, talk to collaboration tools, and execute tasks, then compromise, misuse, or simple misconfiguration can expose the same sensitive assets your staff relies on every day. Multiple security teams have highlighted how agentic workflows amplify familiar problems like prompt injection, credential exposure, and unsafe tool execution.

Second, ecosystems become distribution channels. Several researchers have reported malicious activity in the broader OpenClaw skills ecosystem, including malware delivered through skill content and social engineering patterns that trick users and agents into running unsafe commands. This is a classic supply chain problem, except the target is an always-on assistant that users trust with broad access.

Third, data exposure can come from the surrounding services, not just the agent itself. A recent example by Wiz involved a misconfiguration in a backend database tied to Moltbook, a social network concept for bots, which reportedly exposed large volumes of sensitive data and keys. The lesson is simple: agent adjacent services often move fast, and fast is where security gaps appear.

The practical takeaway for defenders

Even if you never deploy Moltbot in your enterprise, your users can. Even if your users never install Moltbot, they can still use Claude directly through web access, desktop apps, or API based tooling. From a network controls perspective, what matters is not the brand name of the agent, it is the underlying service being accessed and the risk posture your organization has decided is acceptable.

That is where Protective DNS shines. It gives you a clean, proactive control point: resolve or do not resolve, connect or do not connect.

ThreatSTOP protections that address Claude use on the network

ThreatSTOP maintains two dedicated targets that organizations can use to detect and prevent Claude use across their environments:

  • Claude AI Detection Domains
  • Claude AI Detection IPs

These targets are designed to protect networks by identifying and stopping access paths associated with Claude, whether usage is direct, embedded inside a tool, or routed through an agent framework such as Moltbot.

It is important to be explicit about what this means. Because Moltbot can be configured to use Claude in the cloud, blocking Claude blocks that Moltbot configuration. At the same time, these targets are broader by design: they aim to cover all Claude usage, not only Moltbot. That broader coverage is what makes the protection operationally useful.

How Protective DNS applies the protection

Protective DNS includes DNS Defense Cloud and DNS Defense.

With DNS Defense Cloud, your users rely on ThreatSTOP managed DNS servers in the cloud. When a device attempts to resolve a Claude related domain, the request is evaluated against ThreatSTOP intelligence and the configured targets. If the request matches, the resolution is proactively stopped at the DNS layer, preventing the connection from ever being established.

With DNS Defense, the same intelligence and targets are applied while the customer keeps DNS infrastructure on their own network. This approach supports environments where policy control and internal DNS ownership are requirements, while still receiving continuously updated protections curated by the ThreatSTOP Security, Intelligence, and Research team.

In both models, DNS becomes a prevention layer that is easy to reason about and hard to bypass accidentally. That matters for agentic AI, where a single automated workflow can create repeated outbound activity at scale.

How IP Defense complements DNS controls

Some environments also want protections at the IP enforcement layer, especially where security controls are implemented on routers, firewalls, IPS platforms, and cloud enforcement points such as AWS WAF systems. IP Defense extends ThreatSTOP protections to IP based block lists so you can apply the same intent, prevent unauthorized Claude access, across IP enforcement points.

This layered approach matters because real world usage patterns vary. Some clients will see the story in DNS first, others will prefer to enforce at the network edge, and many will do both.

What this means for Moltbot specifically

If a user runs Moltbot configured to use Claude, the activity must reach Claude infrastructure to function. In practice, a policy that detects and prevents Claude access will also detect and prevent that Moltbot configuration.

At the same time, security programs should avoid over focusing on one tool name. The bigger risk category is agentic AI paired with powerful permissions, rapid ecosystem growth, and optional skill extensions. The safer strategy is to define a clear policy for AI services, then use Protective DNS and IP Defense to implement that policy consistently across all networks and endpoints.

Extending visibility and protection beyond Claude with Application Control Bundles

Claude and Moltbot are not isolated cases. They represent a broader shift toward AI services becoming embedded across workflows, developer tools, browsers, collaboration platforms, and automation frameworks. As organizations evaluate risk, most quickly realize the challenge is not managing one AI provider, but managing many, often with inconsistent visibility and controls.

ThreatSTOP addresses this through our Application Control Bundles. These bundles extend Protective DNS and IP Defense coverage beyond a single AI platform, allowing organizations to apply consistent policy across a wide range of AI services and emerging tools.  Many AI platforms can be blocked using the selections inside Application Control.  We do not recommend turning on everything in Application Control.  Be selective.

Application Control Bundles provide protections for categories such as generative AI platforms, developer assistants, automation services, and data processing APIs. This allows security teams to detect, allow, restrict, or prevent access to entire classes of applications rather than reacting tool by tool as new services appear.

From an operational perspective, this approach delivers three important advantages.

First, it reduces policy sprawl. Instead of chasing individual domains as new AI services gain popularity, organizations can rely on curated bundles maintained by the ThreatSTOP Security, Intelligence, and Research team. These bundles evolve as the ecosystem evolves.

Second, it supports intentional enablement. Many organizations want to allow specific AI services for specific roles while restricting others. Application Control Bundles make it possible to design policies that support approved innovation while still protecting sensitive environments.

Third, it strengthens prevention at scale. Whether protections are enforced through DNS Defense Cloud, DNS Defense on customer owned infrastructure, or IP Defense at network enforcement points, the same intelligence and intent applies consistently.

Our partnership with Glasswing.ai is crucial for maintaining true control over over 4000 distinct AI services. This partnership enables us to evaluate and prevent unauthorized access to AI services across the corporate network.  See our press release for further information.

Building a pragmatic policy around agentic AI

Organizations are taking a range of positions, from full allowance to strict restriction. Many are choosing a middle path:

  1. Allow approved AI services for approved roles and devices
  2. Restrict unapproved AI services by default
  3. Monitor for new usage, then tune policy as workflows mature
  4. Require authentication controls, logging, and acceptable use guardrails for any allowed agent deployments

ThreatSTOP helps you execute that middle path in a way that is measurable and enforceable, without turning productivity policy into an endless endpoint configuration exercise.

Call to action

For those interested in joining the ThreatSTOP family, or to learn more about our proactive protections for all environments, we invite you to visit our product page. Discover how our solutions can make a significant difference in your digital security landscape. We have pricing for all sizes of customers. Get started with a Demo today.

 

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MITRE ATT&CK alignment matrix

Risk or behavior discussed

ATT&CK tactic

Relevant technique

Agent uses web APIs for remote interaction and control

Command and Control

Application Layer Protocol, Web Protocols T1071.001

Skills or extensions deliver malicious payloads or tooling

Execution

Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059

Social engineering convinces user or agent to run unsafe commands

Execution

User Execution T1204

Exposure of API keys and credentials in services or tooling

Credential Access

Unsecured Credentials T1552

Agent driven data movement to external services

Exfiltration

Exfiltration Over Web Service T1567